¹ See, for example, Millet, Alan R., Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York, 1980)Google Scholar; Simmons, Edwin H., United States Marines, 1775–1975 (New York, 1976)Google Scholar; and Moskin, J. Robert, The United States Marine Corps Story (New York, 1976).Google Scholar

² For the definitive operational history of the Río Coco Patrol see Edson, Merritt A., ‘The Coco Patrol’, Marine Corps Gazette (08, 11 1936; 02 1937).Google Scholar

³ For an account of just how common ethnic conflicts have become and their presentday potential for great power manipulation, see Nietschmann, Bernard, ‘The Third World War’, Cultural Survival Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 3 (1987).Google Scholar

⁴ Although some readers might disagree with the use of the term ‘native army’ to describe military collaboration between US and Third World military forces, in fact, in many cases the US soldiers who have executed US policies made just this connection. During the period of the so-called ‘Banana Wars’ – the occupations of Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua in the first part of this century – at least some US Marines looked to European empires for precedents to understand better their own occupation experiences. The following quote from a Marine beginning his tour of duty in Haiti clearly demonstrates the tendency to emulate European, especially British, colonial models in US Caribbean experiences:

‘I was coming back as an officer in the Haitain Army. A sort of white Emir to command the black troops of a province.

‘The United States had occupied Haiti. That was in 1915. Marines had cleaned up the country and pacified it…Marines supplied officers for the Haitian native army, the Gendarmerie d'Haiti. This was a force of romance. Black troopers, white officers, a constabulary rather than a real army. A sort of West Indian version of the Northwest Mounted Police, or the Punjab Border Patrol. 1 spoke a little French, and applied for duty with the Gendarmerie. Now I was on my way to serve for a three-year term under the Haitian flag’. Craige, John Houston, Black Bagdad (New York, 1933). p. 2.Google Scholar

⁵ For an excellent summary of Indian Scouts in the Western USA see Utley, Robert M., Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891 (New York, 1973), pp. 54–6.Google Scholar For an account of the US Army's attempt to integrate Indians into the force as regular soldiers see Foner, Jack D., The United States Soldier Between Two Wars: Army Life and Reforms, 1865–1898 (New York, 1970), pp. 129–31.Google Scholar For an account of the use of vigilantes in Haiti see Wirkus, Faustin, The White King of La Gonave (New York, 1931), pp. 85–8.Google Scholar For a description of Company M in Nicaragua see Macaulay, Neill, The Sandino Affair (Durham, North Carolina, 1985), p. 173.Google Scholar For an excellent description of the ethnic dimensions of the War in Vietnam in both its French and US phases see McAlister, John T. Jr, ‘Mountain Minorities and the Viet Minh: A Key to the Indochina War’, in Kunstadter, Peter, (ed), Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities and Nations, vol. 2, Princeton, 1967), pp. 771–840.Google Scholar

⁶ For an account of the protests against US intervention in the Philippines at the turn of the century see Miller, Stuart Creighton, Benevolent Assimilation (New Haven, 1982), pp. 104–128.Google Scholar For a description of the protests against the US involvement in Nicaragua 1927–33 see Macaulay, , The Sandino Affair, pp. 112–13.Google Scholar

⁷ A good example of another form of military innovation inspired by the particular difficulties the United States encounters in irregular warfare is the innovative use of Marine airpower in Nicaragua during the war against Sandino. The same pressures that impelled Edson to undertake his creative collaboration with the Miskito also inspired technological advances. Airplanes, for example, were used as flying ambulances during the US Marine intervention. The rationale for using planes in this new way stemmed, however, not just from humanitarian concerns, but also from the special political considerations which are part of small wars. As one Marine officer writing in Marine Corps Gazette at the time of the intervention against Sandino put it, medical evacuation by air was necessary for political as much as for humanitarian reasons:

‘The saving of human lives, white men's lives, in these brown wars is worthy of the most serious thought, not only because a life is a life, and it is a humane thing to do, but because in our operations for the advancement and stabilization of some weaker republic, great censure is brought to bear upon our Military Policy (sic) by those at home, by politicians, fanatics, and reformers, who in their narrow mindedness and selfishness, lose sight of the fact that these men [the Marines] are doing what they are paid to do, that they are protecting the lives and property of our citizens and that their sacrifice is for the general advancement and stabilization of the world at large’. Captain Campbell, H.Denny, ‘Aviation in Guerrilla Warfare’, Marine Corps Gazette (11 1930. p. 34.Google Scholar

Thus political necessity becomes the mother of military invention – either technological invention or experimentation in new kinds of partnerships with local allies – when the United States finds itself involved in a controversial and undeclared small war.

⁸ See Langley, Lester, The Banana Wars: An Inner History of the American Empire (Lexington, Kentucky, 1985), p. 191Google Scholar and Wood, Bryce, The Making of the Good Neighbor (New York and London, 1961), p. 19.Google Scholar Sandino's fame even spread to China, where the Kuomintang named a unit of its own after the Nicaraguan guerrilla. Macaulay, Neill, The Sandino Affair (Durham, North Carolina, 1985), p. 114.Google Scholar

⁹ Early in the campaign General Logan Feland, US Marine Commander in Nicaragua, sent a letter to all officers which stated, ‘In order to overcome [Sandino's propaganda] we must always be seeking to build up confidence in the native people. This in the long run might accomplish as much as the actual killing of bandits… All patrols should make it their business to acquaint the native with true conditions [i.e. the US version of events]. If a Marine patrol goes through a town without doing this it has lost sight of a valuable aid and has failed to carry out the Commanding General's policy.’ Headquarters, Second Brigade Marine Corps, Managua, Nicaragua, 11 May 1928. Intelligence Information on Memorandum for all Officers and Units. Signed: H. Schmidt, Major USMC, B-2, File: 2.6. Container 19, Edson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., hereafter referred to as LC.

¹⁰ According to Edson, eastern Nicaragua hosted 90% of the US investments in the country. Edson, Merritt A., ‘The Coco Patrol’, Marine Corps Gazette (08 1936), p. 20.Google Scholar

¹¹ In fact, the boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua was in dispute at this time. None the less, Marine operations never penetrated further into Honduras than the north shore of the Coco.

¹² Edson, , ‘Coco Patrol’, Marine Corps Gazette (08 1936), p. 18.Google Scholar

¹³ Edson encountered the Indian King during his time along the Coco in 1928. In a letter to his wife he said, ‘Am including a picture taken of river my first trip in March – one of the last Miskito Indian King…’. Letter to wife, Ethel R. Edson, Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, 21 June 1928. Letters Nicaragua, MAE to ERE, 5 April 1928 to July 1928. Container 2, Edson Papers, LC.

¹⁴ Nietschmann, Bernard, Between Land and Water: The Subsistence Ecology of the Miskito Indians, Eastern Nicaragua (New York and London, 1973), p. 24.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Edson, , ‘Coco Patrol’, Marine Corps Gazette (08 1936), p. 22.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 38

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 40

¹⁸ Edson described Sandino's support network along the Coco River in the following manner: ‘Through his agents, Sandino exerted a distinct influence throughout the whole valley and he received tribute of both money and food from as far east as Bocay.’ The Marine also understood the position of the Local British and American producers. As he later wrote of one such individual, ‘With no assurance that [the Marines] would garrison the area or stay long enough to eradicate the bandit element, the probability of bandit reprisal for assistance to us outweighed…the advantages to be obtained thereby since he had every intention of living here long after our withdrawal from the country’. Edson, , ‘Coco Patrol’, Marine Corps Gazette (08 1936), pp. 39–40.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Quoted in McClellan, Edwin North, ‘The Saga of the Coco’, Marine Corps Gazette (November, 1930), p. 73.Google Scholar

²⁰ Edson, , ‘Coco Patrol’, Marine Corps Gazette (08 1936), p. 40.Google Scholar

²¹ Ibid., p. 41.

²² In an illustrated letter to his son, for example, Edson describes the Indians' boatbuilding techniques, the shelters they use, their tools and cooking pots. etc. Letter to son, M.Austin Edson Jr, dated Musawas, Nicaragua, 22 May 1928. ‘Letters, Nicaragua, MAE to ERE, 5 April 1928 to 8 July 1928’, Container 2, Edson Papers, LC.

²³ Edson, , ‘Coco Patrol’, Marine Corps Gazette (08 1936), p. 40.Google Scholar

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 32–42.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 42.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 43.

²⁷ In his later writings Edson would use a good deal of circumlocution to justify his actions. In the following passage he tries to distinguish Marine methods of using the Indians from those of Nicaraguan armies. In the end, however, he merely demonstrates the similarity of the impressment resorted to bv both sides and his own discomfort with the tactic, despite its military necessity. As he wrote, ‘The alternative was to obtain native crews. Under similar circumstances any Nicaraguan force – outlaw, revolutionary or national – would resort to conscription, giving the Indians plenty of abuse, no pay and very little food for their labor. I had gone to a great deal of trouble to gain the confidence and friendliness of these people. I could count on them for any assistance I might need along that section of the river which we occupied and controlled but I was well aware that any attempt to hire them for a movement into unoccupied territory which might result in contact with the outlaw forces was doomed to failure. Under the circumstances, however, I decided that I was fully justified in using Indian boatmen if I could get them.’ Edson, , ‘Coco Patrol’, Marine Corps Gazette (08 1936), p. 45.Google Scholar

²⁸ Ibid., p. 45.

²⁹ Edson, , ‘Coco Patrol’ Marine Corps Gazette (11 1936), pp. 40–1.Google Scholar In fact, these long-standing fears still persist among the peoples of the coast. ‘The Bribri, Cabecar, Teribe and Guaymi peoples of Panama and Costa Rica…have all retained elaborate tales of [the] Miskitu Wats. In fact, Guaymi parents scold misbehaving children with: “The Musiki (Guayami for Miskitu) will come and get you”’. Fieldwork by Philippe Bourgois in Limon, Costa Rica and Bocas del Toro, Panama, 1982–83. Cited in Bourgois, Philippe, ‘The Miskitu of Nicaragua: Politicized Ethnicity’, Anthropology Today, vol. 2, no. 2 (04 1986).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ Edson, , ‘Coco Patrol’, Marine Corps Gazette (11 1936), p. 40.Google Scholar

³¹ Letter to Mother, Bocay, Nicaragua, 11 June 1928. Letters to Sister and Parents, Dec. 1927–Aug. 1929, USS Denver, Puerto Cabezas, 51st Company, Poteca, Coco River, Container 2, Edson Papers, LC.

³² Letter to wife, Ethel R. Edson, Musawas, Nicaragua 21 May 1928. Letters Nicaragua, MAE to ERE,; April 1928 to July 1928, Container 2, Edson Papers, LC.

³³ Letter to wife, Ethel R. Edson, Bocay, Nicaragua, 4 June 1928. Letters Nicaragua, MAE to ERE, 5 April 1928 to 8 July 1928, Container 2, Edson Papers, LC.

³⁴ Letter to son, M. Austin Edson, Jr, from Musawas, Nicaragua, 22 May 1928. Letters, Nicaragua, MAE to ERE, 5 April 1928 to 8 July 1928, no. 16, Container 2, Edson LC.

³⁵ Letter to wife, Ethel R. Edson, Bocay, Nicaragua, 4 June 1928, ‘Letters, Nicaragua, MAE to ERE. 5 April 1928 to 8 July 1928’, Container 2, Edson Papers, LC.

³⁶ Edson, , ‘Coco Patrol’ Marine Corps Gazette (11 1936), p. 41.Google Scholar

³⁷ Edson, , ‘Coco Patrol’, Marine Corps Gazette (02 1937), pp. 38, 40–41.Google Scholar

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 41, 42.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 42.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 57, quoting a personal letter dated at Mustawas, Nicaragua, 5 August 1928.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² See letter from Webster to Edson, Bocay, Nicaragua, January 11, 1919, (sic) [actual year 1929] and letter from another Marine officer (signature illegible) from Bocay, Nicaragua to Edson at Poteca, 4 October 1928. Folder: ‘For Action’, Container 18, Edson Papers, LC.

⁴³ Letter from Commander Eastern Area to the Commanding General, Second Brigade, 26 March 1929, PC 127, Box IV, Utley Papers, United States Marine Corps Historical Center, Building 58, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. Hereafter referred to as USMC Center.

⁴⁴ Letter from Commander Eastern Area to the Commanding General, Second Brigade, 26 March 1929, PC 127, Box IV, Utley Papers, USMC Historical Center.

⁴⁵ The section on Small Wars Operations reads like a history of Edson's mission. The book generalises about his experience. Evidently, both Utley and Edson assumed that what the latter learned in Nicaragua would apply to river operations throughout Latin America. See Small Wars Operations, Container 21, Edson Papers, LC.

⁴⁶ Edson, in a rather convoluted passage in the same letter, also indicated that some political tension existed between the Marines and the locals in this lower-class section of Puerto Cabezas: ‘There has been no political troubles here, (sic) the only disorders coming for individual outbreaks against the americans (sic) in general. About three weeks ago three of the natives attempted to cut up a marine (sic) guard on one of the trains going through the country with the result that all three natives were shot, two of them killed and the other one rather seriously wounded. Since then there has not been a bit of trouble’, (my italics) Letter to wife, Ethel R. Edson, 3 January 1928. Letters, Nicaragua, MAE to ERE, 17 December 1927 to 29 March 1928, Container 2, Edson Papers, LC.

⁴⁷ Marine intelligence reports discussed the high level of venereal disease among the prostitutes and their white customers. ‘Practically all prostitutes live in Bilway, most of them Indians, some are of Spanish descent. There is no Government supervision or segregation and practically all are infected [with venereal disease]. As a result, a large number of the white employees of the company have become infected with gonorrhea, syphilis and chancroid.’ US Marine Corps Division of Operations and Training, intelligence Section, Monograph of Nicaragua, index to Maps of Nicaragua, 15 12 1953Google Scholar, Puerto Cabezas, 601–100, USMC Library, USMC Historical Center. In 1927 the prostitutes of Bilwi helped Sandino run guns up the Río Coco to the Liberals. Molieri, Jorge Jenkins, El desafio indígena en Nicaragua: el caso de los miskitos (Managua, Nicaragua, 1986), p. 139.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Even before the Depression hit, evidence indicates that the Indians' combined subordinate status as both ethnic minority and working class created the potential for instability. One Guardia Nacional officer's report concludes that ‘the strikes are not evidence of unrest but were organised with the hope of some slight concession from the company and thereby gaining political prestige particularly among the indians (sic)’. (my italics). Headquarters, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Managua, Nicaragua, 23 November 1929, GN-2 Memorandum, Extract from monthly Record of Events of the Eastern Area, Guardia Nacional, Bluefields, for the Month of October, E. Entry 206, RG 127, National Archives of the United States, hereafter referred to as NA.

⁴⁹ The Department of Commerce prepared a review of Nicaragua's economic conditions for the Marines. It says of the East coast in the year 1931, ‘Unemployment on the east coast area was further accentuated by the curtailment of operations by the banana and lumber companies and purchasing power was greatly lowered.’ Review of Conditions in Nicaragua (prepared by the Latin American Section of the Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C.) 6, entry 201, RG 127, NA. Another source reports how the Depression affected the availability of consumer goods. In Bluefields, for example, the large retail and dry goods store, Jorge Dreyfus and Company, was reported to be ‘closing out its business, and intends to reopen in Managua. In common with other stores they have been loosing (sic) money regularly, reducing stock to barest necessities, and have finally decided to accept their losses, and reopen in a more favorable locality’. US Marine Corps Division of Operations and Training, Intelligence Section, Monograph of Nicaragua, Index to maps of Nicaragua, 15 December 1933, Department of Bluefields, 600. USMC Library, USMC Historical Center.

⁵⁰ ‘I am enclosing my report of what happened in the mining area, and I am sure you will be interested to read it. They certainly timed things with the evacuation. While I was gone, there was quite a scare here, as things looked like a revolution. The Asheville and the Denver were here with Admiral Campbell, and he was rather worried. Things are all quiet now’, (my italics) Extracts from letterfrom Lt W. W. Benson to [Capt.] W. C. Hall dated at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, 7 July 1930. File 2.6. with a white label which reads ‘167’, Container 19, Edson Papers, LC.

⁵¹ Kepner, Charles David and Soothill, Jay H., The Banana Empire: A Case Study in Economic Imperialism (New York, 1935), p. 286.Google Scholar For other effects of the Depression on the Atlantic coast see also Macaulay, , Sandino Affair, p. 186.Google Scholar

⁵² Correspondence from the Area Commander Eastern Area to the Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Managua, Nicaragua. Subject: Conditions on the East Coast, 22 July 1931, File 44.0, Entry 202, RG 127, NA.

⁵³ Correspondence from the Area Commander, Eastern Area to the Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Managua, Nicaragua, Subject: Conditions on the East Coast, 22 July 1931. File 44.0, Entry 202, RG 127, NA.

⁵⁴ See, for example, letter from Area Commander of the Guardia Nacional John Marston to the Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional, 7 October 1930. File 44.0, Entry 202, RG 127, NA.

⁵⁵ Dept of Northern Bluefields, Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, 12 May 1932. From Lt. E. J. Suprenant, GN to the Jefe Director. Subject: Information gathered from a scouting patrol in this area. File 29, Entry 201, RG 127, NA.

⁵⁶ ‘After the murder of missionary Karl Brezenger in 1931, the Moravians had reason to be suspicious of the National Guard which evidently tried to capitalise on the fear of Sandino by demanding financial support from the mission in return for protection.’ In 1931 Brother Shimer of the Moravians wrote to SPG Board President Samuel Gapp: ‘I do not think any very serious effort is being made to put down the bandits. The National Guardsmen always go after them after the bandits have made an attack,’ SPG Correspondence, S. H. Gapp Files, 15 July, 1932. Both quotations are from Adams, Anna, ‘Missionaries and Revolutionaries,’ Missiology: An International Review, vol. 15, no. 2 (04 1987), p. 56.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Carta al General Pedro Altamirano, 30 de marzo 1931, Sandino, August C., Pensamiento Vivo, Tomo 2 (Managua, Nicaragua, 1984), número 183, p. 165.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ The flyers predicted disaster for the Marines and a revolution in the United States. Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Area del Este, Bluefields, Nicaragua, from the American Commander, Eastern Area to the Jefe Director, 7 April 1931. Signed John Marston (USMC). File E, Entry 206, RG 127, NA.

⁵⁹ Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Cuartel General, Area Este, 4 May 1931. From: Area Commander Eastern Area to Jefe Director, Headquarters, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Managua, Nicaragua. Subject: An Intelligence Report on the Activities of Sandino, Blandon and Cockburn. Signed John Marston (USMC) File 2.6, Box 19, Edson Papers, LC.

⁶⁰ For the redistribution of stolen cattle see Note by Area Commander, Bluefields-Nicaragua: Period covered by this report believed to be first week of September 1931: ‘Intelligence’. Captain McAfee's weekly report, signed by lnman. File R, Entrv 206, RG 127, NA. For an account of unrest and redistribution in the mining district see Copy of report of Lieutenant W. W. Benson dated May 29, 1930. Neptune Patrol, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Neptune Mine Nicaragua, 29 May 1930. File 2.6, Box 19, Edson Papers, LC.

⁶¹ Eventually, the Marines caught on to Cockburn's activities and he was killed in a shoot-out with the Guardia Nacional on 3 October, 1931. In April the following year several members of the Guardia unit at Kisalaya rebelled, killing their US officer and fleeing into the woods to join the Sandinistas. Allegedly, a Sandinista plant inspired the mutiny by capitalising on the anger of several Miskito Guardsmen over Cockburn's death. See Macaulay, , Sandino Affair, pp. 188–9, 223.Google Scholar

⁶² By 1931 some Moravians were beginning to worry that because the Marines had become so hated, the US missionaries might suffer as well. See Adams, , ‘Missionaries and Revolutionaries’, p. 56.Google Scholar

⁶³ US Marine Corps Division of Operations and Training, Intelligence Section. Monograph of Nicaragua, Index to Maps of Nicaragua, 15 12 1933Google Scholar. Sacklin, 602, USMC Library, USMC Historical Center.

⁶⁴ On 18 July 193 1 Gordon W. Heritage and his navigator and another two-man crew in a separate seaplane were patrolling the Río Coco. As Heritage swooped in on the village of Sacklin to investigate a saddled horse, he noticed that ‘…a bullet hole suddenly appeared in the lower wing of my plane’. In response, Heritage decided to attack the small river settlement. As he later wrote, ‘being fired upon we were justified in bombing the town… The two of us dropped nineteen bombs… When our supply of bombs became exhausted, we resorted to the sub-Thompson [Thompson submachine gun], and the accuracy of Corporal Simmons [his navigator] proved very effective. I noticed that during our bombing we hit several boats and thatched huts. What other damage we inflicted, I do not know…although 1 heard that we had succeeded in eliminating practically all banditry from that territory’. Heritage, Gordon W., Staff Sergeant, USMC, ‘Forced Down in the Jungles of Nicaragua’, Leatherneck (05 1932), pp. 13–15.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Letter from Carlos A. Bravo, Private Secretary to Gen. Douglas C. McCougal, Campo del Marte, 16 Oct. 1929, translation from Spanish attached. File E, RG 127, NA.

⁶⁶ Letter from Miskito Indians of Bilwi to the Honorable Colonel Wynn, Commander, Guardia Nacional, Eastern Area, Bluefields, Nicaragua, 15 May 1931. File E, Bilwi, Entry 206, RG 127, NA.

⁶⁷ Letter from Miskito Indians of Bilwi to the Honorable Colonel Wynr., Commander, Guardia Nacional, Eastern Area, Bluefields, Nicaragua, 15 May 1931. File E. Bilwi, Entry 206, RG 127, NA. It is ironic that such a supplicatory document should come from Bilwi, part of Puerto Cabezas, where class tensions had risen significantly since the onset of the Depression. Nonetheless, that the two contrary tendencies, the fond wish for North American overlordship and lower-class unrest, should coexist in the same area is not surprising. In the towns along the coast US cultural influence was strongest and class lines were most clearly drawn. Both were by-products of the same process of agro-export development.

⁶⁸ Anthropologist Mary Helms reported that the Miskito still considered the North Americans to be their special patrons and protectors in the late 1960s. Writing at that time, she said, ‘enthusiasm for the Americans and their culture is predicated on the attitude that it is the Americans who are concerned with the welfare of the Miskito, replacing the earlier British in this respect. Americans have owned and operated the various lumbering, mining, and banana enterprises that have offered the Miskito jobs and cash, villagers explain, and it is the Americans who serve as missionaries’. Helms, Mary, Asang: Adaptations to Culture Contact in a Miskito Community (Gainesville, Florida, 1971), pp. 221–2.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Edson, , ‘Coco Patrol’, Marine Corps Gazette (11 1936), pp. 40–1.Google Scholar Brezenger's death has long been something of an embarrassment for the Sandinistas' defenders. Most accounts explain his killing as a mistake (see Macaulay, , Sandino Affair, p. 190Google Scholar). Others have noted the curious lack of outcry on the part of the Moravians over his death. (See Adams, , ‘Missionaries and Revolutionaries’, p. 50Google Scholar). In fact, Marine records reveal that the murdered Moravian missionary had ‘offered his services as an intelligence agent for the Guardia’. This may explain why Sandinista Lieutenant Pedro Blandon had the German killed and why the Moravians never publicly condemned the insurgents for his death. US Marine Corps Division of Operations and Training, Intelligence Section, Monograph of Nicaragua, Index to Maps of Nicaragua, 15 12 1933Google Scholar, Puerto Cabezas, 602, USMC Library, USMC Historical Center.

⁷⁰ One praiseworthy aspect of Edson's work was the conspicuous lack of racism in his approach. Though the Miskito are part African, Edson's behaviour reflected none of the prejudices of his day, nor did he repeat the kind of open bigotry that some Marines showed towards the Haitians during the US occupation of that country.

⁷¹ Phone interview with United States Marine Corps General Vernon E. Megee (ret'd), October 1985. Megee is a veteran of the 1926–33 Nicaragua campaign.

⁷² Levi-Strauss, Claude. ‘Anthropology: Its Achievement and Future’, Current Anthropology, vol. 7 (1966), p. 126CrossRefGoogle Scholar, quoted in Wolf, Eric R. and Jorgensen, Joseph C., ‘Anthropology on the Warpath in Thailand’, The New York Review of books (19 11 1970).Google Scholar

⁷³ Letter from Merritt A. Edson to wife, Musawas, Nicaragua, 21 May 1928. Letters, Nicaragua, MAE to ERE, 5 April 1928 to 8 July 1928. Container 2, Edson Papers, LC.

⁷⁴ Indeed, the Reagan administration has strongly identified with the Miskito cause, so much so that on one occasion the President even stated, ‘I am a Miskito’ (cited by Diskin, Marta, ‘The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles’, in Walker, Thomas W. (ed.), Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua (Boulder, Colorado, 1987), p. 80.Google Scholar Thus, the liberation component of an ethno-liberation strategy still has considerable Utility when US leaders need to justify interventionist policies.

⁷⁵ Certainly it had been forgotten in terms of official doctrine. Nonetheless, there are suggestions that a certain institutional memory of the Banana Wars may have persisted, at least within the Marine Corps, and that this influenced the conduct of the US Marines in Vietnam. Note the following quotation from an official US Marine Corps history of the Vietnam War, ‘Fighting guerrillas was not a new experience for the Marine Corps. General Walt [Commanding General, Third Marine Amphibious Force which was operating in Vietnam in 1965] recalled that as a young officer he learned the fundamentals of his profession ‘from men who had fought Sandino in Nicaragua or Charlemagne [Peralt] in Haiti.’ Shulimson, Jack and Johnson, Major Charles M., USMC, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, History and Museums Division, US Marine Corps, (Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 133.Google Scholar In addition it is worth noting that the Small Wars Manual was re-published by the US Marines in 1987, ‘as an aid to education and training in the historical approach of Marine Corps units conducting operations in low-intensity conflicts’. Small Wars Manual: (Reprint of 1940 Edition), US Marine Corps (1987). Even though the doctrinal link between the ‘Banana Wars’ and US counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia was tenuous, a matter of vague ‘institutional memory’, the present Marine command is determined that this will not be the case in future small wars – now known as ‘low-intensity conflicts’.

⁷⁶ Schrock, Joann L., Stockton, William Jr, Murphy, Elaine M. and Fromme, Marilou (contributors), Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam, Ethnographic Study Series (Washington, D.C., 1966)Google Scholar, Library of Congress Card Catalog number, DS 557.A5A7.

⁷⁷ Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam, pp. 513–18.

⁷⁸ Indeed, after the Depression hit, even the white businessmen of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast no longer constituted a priority for Washington. By April 1931, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson had concluded that the American businessmen of the Miskito Coast were ‘“ a pampered lot of people” who thought that they had “a right to call for troops whenever any danger apprehends”‘. At this time, Stimson changed official US policy in regard to its nationals in Nicaragua. The Secretary of State directed the US legation in Managua to tell US citizens who did not feel secure in the country that they should leave. Washington would no longer guarantee their lives and property. Macaulay, , The Sandino Affair, pp. 198–9.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Edson himself recommended the use of native labour in manning the boats of the upper river not only for the Indians' skill with the canoes, but also as a way of making more Marines available to fight. As he said in a letter to Major Utley, ‘Whenever possible natives who are familiar with the river being traversed should be utilized as boatmen… [This] relieves the personnel of all duty other than that of combat’. Letter from Edson to Utley, 8 April 1930. File 176, Container 20, Edson Papers, LC.