National leaders who fear being overthrown in a coup d’état sometimes act to reduce coup risk; these actions are termed coup-proofing. This chapter describes and analyzes the proposition that coup-proofing might reduce military effectiveness. The chapter surveys the proposition that coup-threatened leaders field less effective militaries, describing the primary coup-proofing tools some leaders employ that also degrade fighting power. The chapter then describes three revisions to this proposition. First, leaders account for both internal coup and external military threat, and when facing high external threat they reduce coup-proofing efforts to bolster military effectiveness. Second, not all coup-proofing tools reduce military effectiveness. Leaders can sometimes reduce coup risk without degrading military effectiveness. Third, even when coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness, leaders can compensate by engaging in other foreign and military policy initiatives, such as developing weapons of mass destruction or entering alliances, to protect national security.
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