Few cases are cited more frequently in discussions about juries than Bushell’s Case (1670). It is regularly invoked as authority for the proposition that juries may ignore the law, disregard the evidence, and return whatever verdict conscience dictates. In modern debates about jury nullification, Bushell’s Case is often presented as establishing a constitutional right of jurors to decide cases according to their personal sense of justice.
The problem is that the case does not say that.
In my view, Bushell’s Case may be one of the most misunderstood authorities in the common law.
What Bushell’s Case Actually Decided
The case arose from the trial of William Penn and William Mead in 1670. The jury refused to convict despite significant pressure from the trial judge. The jurors were fined and imprisoned for returning a verdict that the court considered unsatisfactory.
One of those jurors, Edward Bushell, challenged his imprisonment by way of habeas corpus. The question before Chief Justice Vaughan was not whether jurors were entitled to disregard the evidence. Nor was it whether jurors possessed a constitutional right to acquit according to conscience.
The issue was much narrower.
Could jurors be punished by the court merely because the judge disagreed with their verdict?
The answer was no.
Vaughan CJ held that jurors could not be fined or imprisoned for the verdict they returned. The decision protected the independence of the jury from judicial coercion. It established that judges could not punish jurors simply because they reached a conclusion different from the one the judge thought correct.
That principle was both important and enduring. It is not, however, the same thing as saying that jurors are free to decide cases on any basis they choose.
The judgment in fact considers how it is acceptable that two people may reasonably take different views based on the same testimony. The evidence was very much in the mind of Vaughan CJ. Not morality. Vaughan’s main rational was that we cannot know that the jury was wrong about the facts because the trial Judge came to a different view of the evidence.
The word most commonly associated with Bushell’s Case today is ‘conscience’. Yet Vaughan CJ’s judgment is concerned not with conscience but with competence: the competence of a court to second-guess the reasoning of a jury and punish jurors for reaching a conclusion different from that preferred by the judge.
How the Myth Developed
Part of the difficulty is that many discussions of Bushell’s Case begin not with Vaughan CJ’s judgment but with the famous memorial plaque displayed in the Old Bailey. The plaque records:
“Near this Site WILLIAM PENN and WILLIAM MEAD were tried in 1670 for preaching to an unlawful assembly in Grace Church Street. This tablet Commemorates The courage and endurance of the Jury Thos Vere, Edward Bushell and ten others who refused to give a verdict against them, although locked up without food for two nights, and were fined for their final verdict of Not Guilty. The case of these Jurymen was reviewed on a writ of Habeas Corpus and Chief Justice Vaughan delivered the opinion of the Court which established The Right of Juries to give their Verdict according to their Convictions.”
That inscription is undoubtedly one of the reasons why Bushell’s Case is so frequently cited as authority for jury nullification or jury equity. The difficulty is that the plaque is not a law report.
It is a commemoration of what later generations regarded as the constitutional significance of the case. It is not a statement of Vaughan CJ’s decision.
In the case of Bushell’s Case, there has been an evolution of what the case actually establishes. The evolution might be expressed in this way:
- Vaughan CJ held that jurors could not be fined or imprisoned merely because of the verdict they returned.
- Later constitutional lawyers recognised that the decision established the independence of juries from judicial coercion.
- Modern commentators sometimes go further and suggest that jurors possess a right to return whatever verdict conscience dictates.
The first proposition is undoubtedly contained in the case. The second is a fair description of its constitutional importance. The third is far more contentious and is not something Vaughan CJ decided.
The plaque commemorates the second proposition. It is frequently cited as though it established the third.
The result is that the symbolic meaning of the case has, in some discussions, eclipsed its actual legal effect.
Indeed, the wording of the plaque itself demonstrates the point. It refers to “the right of juries to give their verdict according to their convictions”. It says nothing about the juror’s oath. It says nothing about the duty to return a true verdict according to the evidence. It says nothing about the circumstances in which a juror who openly declared an intention to disregard the evidence would immediately be discharged from service.
The plaque captures an important constitutional principle: juries must be free from judicial coercion. But it should not be mistaken for a complete statement of the law governing the duties of jurors.
The danger lies in treating a commemorative inscription as though it were a headnote to the judgment itself.
Jury Independence Is Not The Final Word
The modern tendency is to treat Bushell’s Case as authority for a broad principle of jury sovereignty. The reasoning often proceeds as follows: Jurors cannot be punished for their verdict, therefore jurors may return any verdict they wish, therefore jurors are entitled to ignore the law or the evidence.
The difficulty is that each step goes further than the case itself.
A distinction must be drawn between what a juror is required to do and what the legal system can do if the juror fails to do it.
In England and Wales, jurors swear an oath to “faithfully try the defendant and give a true verdict according to the evidence.” That oath imposes a clear duty. Jurors are expected to decide the case on the evidence presented and in accordance with the judge’s directions on the law.
Nothing in Bushell’s Case removes that obligation.
The case concerns enforcement, not duty. It limits the power of the court to punish jurors for their verdict. It does not redefine the standards by which jurors are supposed to reach that verdict.
The Test of the Proposition
One way of testing whether Bushell’s Case is being interpreted too broadly is to apply its logic to convictions as well as acquittals.
Suppose a juror openly announces before the trial begins:
“I am going to acquit regardless of the evidence.”
No court would permit that juror to remain.
Likewise, suppose a juror announced:
“I am going to convict regardless of the evidence because the defendant has previous convictions.”
Again, the juror would almost certainly be discharged.
In neither case would anyone seriously argue that Bushell’s Case protects such conduct.
The reason is obvious. Jurors are expected to decide cases according to the evidence and their oath. The law treats that obligation as real.
Yet these examples involve exactly the same substitution of personal conviction for evidential assessment that is often defended under the banner of jury nullification.
The fact that the argument is usually advanced only in favour of acquittal demonstrates that the debate is often political rather than doctrinal. The law’s concern is not whether the verdict is merciful or severe. Its concern is whether jurors are performing the function they have sworn to perform.
The Importance of the Jury Room
The real explanation lies elsewhere.
The criminal justice system treats jury deliberations as sacrosanct. The secrecy of the jury room is not an accident. It is a deliberate constitutional choice designed to protect jurors from external pressure and judicial interference.
That choice carries consequences.
Because deliberations are private, the legal system cannot ordinarily investigate the reasoning process by which a verdict is reached. Once a jury retires, the law largely refrains from examining what is said or thought during deliberations. Once a verdict is returned, particularly an acquittal, the opportunities for scrutiny are extremely limited.
As a result, the system inevitably tolerates the possibility that some juries will disregard the evidence, misunderstand the law, or decide cases on grounds inconsistent with their oath.
But toleration is not endorsement.
The law does not instruct jurors that they may ignore the evidence. Judges do not direct juries that conscience may replace proof. Courts do not encourage jurors to disregard legal directions.
Rather, the system accepts that the protection of jury independence comes at a cost. Some improper verdicts will occur because the mechanisms necessary to prevent them would undermine the very independence the jury system seeks to preserve.
The secrecy of the jury room means that the law must tolerate the possibility of jurors acting contrary to their oath. But toleration born of constitutional necessity is not the same thing as legal approval.
The Real Legacy of Bushell’s Case
The true constitutional significance of Bushell’s Case is not that jurors possess an unrestricted right to do as they please.
Its significance is that the state cannot punish jurors merely because it dislikes the verdict they have reached.
That is a profound principle. It protects the jury from becoming an instrument of the executive or the judiciary. It ensures that verdicts are not extracted through threats or coercion.
But it should not be confused with a judicial endorsement of jury nullification or a licence to disregard evidence.
The better view is that Bushell’s Case creates a sphere of jury independence which the courts will not police after the event. Within that sphere, jurors may sometimes fail to comply with their oath. The legal system may be unable to correct that failure. Yet inability to punish is not the same thing as approval.
For that reason, Bushell’s Case is perhaps best understood not as a charter for jury nullification but as a safeguard against judicial coercion. Its legacy is jury independence, not jury omnipotence.