Urbanization: Only One in Four Tajik Residents Lives in a City

While its regional neighbors are increasingly undergoing urbanization, Tajikistan remains a predominantly rural country and the gap with the rest of Central Asia on this indicator is one of the most notable in the post-Soviet space.

The Lowest Rate in the Region

As of mid-2026, Tajikistan’s urban population stands at 27.98%, in other words, only slightly more than one in four residents of the country lives in a city. For comparison with the rest of the region: in Kazakhstan, the urban population is around 59%; in Turkmenistan, around 52%; in Uzbekistan, around 50%; and in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, roughly 38%. Against this backdrop, Tajikistan remains the country with the lowest level of urbanization in all of Central Asia and one of the few in the world where the rural population still makes up nearly three-quarters of the total.

Why This Happened

Tajikistan’s low pace of urbanization is largely explained by the structure of the country’s economy and the everyday life of a significant part of its population. Unlike states where industry, the services sector, and major urban agglomerations have long become the main centers of employment, Tajikistan still retains a notable dependence on agriculture. For many families, the village remains not only a place of residence but also the basis of income: people are engaged in farming, seasonal work, small local businesses, or rely on a household that provides the family with food and partial employment.

In Kyrgyzstan, rural areas also play an important role in the economy and settlement patterns, however, in Tajikistan this feature is more pronounced. The country remains one of the most rural in Central Asia in terms of settlement patterns and employment structure. Against this background, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan present a different picture. In Uzbekistan, a significant share of the urban population is concentrated around major centers, primarily Tashkent, whose population has already exceeded 3 million. In Turkmenistan, Ashgabat plays an important role, as do territories linked to the oil and gas industry, where economic activity has traditionally been more closely tied to urban and industrial zones.

The Region Is Moving Toward Cities

Central Asia as a whole continues to urbanize rapidly, with cities continuing to hoover up people and capital. According to the Eurasian Development Bank, the region’s urban population is expected to increase from 39 million to 45 million by 2035, driven largely by internal migration as people move from rural areas in search of higher incomes and better infrastructure.

Today, nearly half of Central Asia’s population, about 49%, already lives in the region’s major urban centers, making urbanization one of the defining forces behind its economic transformation.

The expansion of cities, however, also brings mounting pressure on social infrastructure – from housing to schools and hospitals. For many urban centers, the challenge is no longer simply accommodating more residents but ensuring an acceptable quality of life. As a result, urbanization is increasingly viewed as a long-term test of governments’ capacity to plan sustainable urban development.

A similar conclusion appears in a United Nations report on global urbanization. Even countries where urban growth has been comparatively slow are expected to continue urbanizing over the coming decades. For Tajikistan, today’s low urbanization rate therefore appears less an exception than a delayed stage of a broader regional trend. The key question is no longer whether the country will urbanize, but how quickly that process will unfold and whether its cities will be prepared to absorb it.

Not Just Numbers But Risks

The Eurasian Development Bank also warns that rapid urbanization comes with significant costs. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have already experienced electricity and water supply disruptions during peak demand periods, illustrating how infrastructure can struggle to keep pace with urban growth.

For Tajikistan, where urbanization remains at a comparatively early stage, these experiences offer a preview of the challenges likely to emerge as migration toward cities accelerates. The country’s relatively limited urban infrastructure means that future population growth could place even greater pressure on municipal services unless investment keeps pace.

The gap between Tajikistan’s urbanization rate of around 28% and Kazakhstan’s nearly 60% is reflects the divergent economic and demographic trajectories that have shaped Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Tajikistan’s predominantly rural character remains an important feature of its economic structure today, sustained population growth and regional development trends suggest that managing urban expansion will become an increasingly important policy challenge in the years ahead.

Tajikistan’s Electricity Losses Add Pressure to Water and Climate Agenda

Tajikistan’s aging power grid has become part of the country’s water and climate policy. The issue returned to the agenda of European Union-Tajikistan cooperation on July 3, when the two sides held a development cooperation meeting in Dushanbe. Energy and water were included in the Global Gateway agenda, while other talks addressed transport and energy infrastructure, the digital economy, water-resource management, and strategic raw materials. Tajikistan gets nearly 98% of its electricity from hydropower. That gives the country a low-carbon power mix, while tying electricity supply to river flows, snowmelt, reservoirs, and glacier change. Losses in the power system add pressure to that link. Each kilowatt-hour lost in transmission or distribution must still be generated. In Tajikistan, that usually means more water passing through hydropower plants or imported electricity when reservoir levels are low. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has focused on concessional funding for loss-reduction projects. After a May meeting between Energy Minister Daler Juma and Holger Wiefel, the EBRD’s head in Tajikistan, the energy ministry put the aim plainly: “The sides discussed attracting concessional financing for projects aimed at reducing electricity losses and improving the efficiency of the country’s energy system.” Officials also discussed private investment. Hydropower plants in the Zarafshan basin and solar plants were discussed as well. No new financing has been announced from those discussions. The immediate context is an existing EBRD- and EU-backed program for the distribution network. The Times of Central Asia previously reported in April that Tajikistan would receive nearly €49.6 million from the EBRD to reduce electricity losses. The package combines a €28 million loan with grants and technical assistance for work in nine branches of the distribution network in Sughd and Khatlon. First Deputy Finance Minister Yusuf Majidi said the project would reduce energy losses, replace worn-out infrastructure, install modern meters, and improve billing and revenue collection. The EBRD project file gives the total project cost as €43 million. It includes up to €28 million in EBRD financing and a €15 million EU co-investment grant through the Asia Pacific Investment Facility. The project targets automatic billing and metering systems in nine networks of the Bokhtar, Kulob, and Guliston branches of Shabakahoi Taqsimoti Barq. The bank says the project is aimed at reducing high inefficiency and technical losses in Tajikistan’s power distribution network. Distribution losses fell from 19.2% in 2024 to 15.6% in 2025. Even after that fall, more than 3.1 billion kWh were lost in 2025. Officials linked the reduction to smart meters and digital metering. President Emomali Rahmon put the issue in direct terms in a late 2023 parliamentary address. “Our electricity losses are about 4 billion kWh,” he said, adding: “If we prevent this, then there will be enough electricity for everyone.” That comment predates the 2025 improvement, but it still explains why loss reduction has become part of the environmental case for energy-sector financing. Cutting losses can free up electricity without new generation and reduce pressure on winter imports and hydropower reservoirs. Reuters reported in December 2025 that Tajikistan had imposed restrictions on energy consumption after a dry autumn reduced water levels at hydropower plants. Nurek Hydroelectric Power Station, which supplies around 70% of the country’s electricity, had a reservoir level 3.5 meters lower than one year earlier. Water stress is now central to Dushanbe’s climate diplomacy. The Times of Central Asia reported in May that Tajikistan hosted the Fourth High-Level International Conference on the International Decade for Action “Water for Sustainable Development” in Dushanbe. The conference brought water security and glacier loss into regional cooperation talks. Around 30% of Tajikistan’s glaciers have disappeared over the past century. Vanch-Yakh Glacier, formerly Fedchenko Glacier, has retreated by more than one kilometer over the past 70 to 80 years. Over the past three decades, more than 1,000 glaciers have disappeared in Tajikistan. The effects of glacier loss are felt well below Tajikistan’s high mountains, where power generation and irrigation depend on the same water systems. Hydropower plants need reliable river flows, while irrigation pumps use electricity to move water to farms. In many areas, canals lose water before it reaches fields. The World Bank approved a $75 million grant on July 1 for a water and irrigation management project. The project will modernize irrigation systems serving 100,000 hectares and aims to help about 470,000 farmers and rural residents. It also targets energy savings of 65,000 MWh and emissions cuts of 29,000 tons of CO2 equivalent per year. “This investment reflects the World Bank’s deep commitment to building a more resilient and sustainable future for Tajikistan,” said Gael Raballand, the World Bank Group Country Manager for Tajikistan. Tajikistan has also drawn new climate finance for water and energy projects. The Green Climate Fund approved two projects for Tajikistan worth $190 million after its June 29 to July 2 board meeting in Dushanbe, with $62 million as grants. The projects cover water-saving technology and municipal water systems, with work planned across several municipalities. The EBRD is also preparing a separate project in Kulob. Its project file describes a proposed €10 million sovereign loan for distribution lines and billing and metering infrastructure in Kulob and surrounding areas. The project file lists July 22, 2026, as the approval date, and 100% of the EBRD financing is classified as green finance. For Tajikistan, water and energy policy now extends beyond new generating capacity. Better metering, lower grid losses, more accurate billing, and modern irrigation can save water and cut wasted electricity as the country’s hydropower system faces a less predictable climate.

Central Asia’s Fuel Squeeze Becomes a Winter Energy Security Problem

Central Asia’s fuel squeeze is moving from filling stations into winter planning. Governments are now tracking gasoline and diesel, gas pipelines, coal deliveries, power imports, jet fuel, and emergency repair crews. Seasonal fuel and power stress is familiar across the region, but the current pressure - tied to Russia, the main supplier for several regional fuel flows - has arrived early. Russia’s own fuel crisis has sharpened the risk. Ukrainian drone attacks and repair work have cut refinery output, while export limits have pushed more Russian supplies back into the domestic market. Reuters reported queues, regional restrictions, and gasoline above 100 roubles a liter at some independent stations. President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the strain on June 28. “You are well aware that problems for drivers and for businesses persist,” he said, adding that “the harvest depends on” keeping seasonal fuel schedules for farms. For Central Asia, Russian shortages travel through contracts, rail slots, import prices, and public nerves. Kyrgyzstan is among the most exposed. The country consumes about two million tons of fuels and lubricants each year, and almost 95% comes from Russia, according to Deputy Energy Minister Nasipbek Kerimov. “Due to the lack of adequate oil and gas production, we remain a country dependent on imports,” Kerimov said. Bishkek has asked Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan for help securing supplies. That dependence is now impacting households, farmers, and small transport firms. The cabinet has capped pump prices and set a subsidy mechanism through September 30. Kerimov said importers were seeing offers at several prices, but promised that “there should be no shortage on the domestic market.” Oil traders put AI-92 stocks at 30 to 45 days, while diesel remained available for harvest work. Kyrgyzstan is trying to buy time through domestic refining. The modernized Junda refinery in the Chuy Region has been pressed to raise gasoline output to 24,000 tons a month soon, then 50,000 tons a month by the end of 2026, with finished products directed to the domestic market. Those gains would help, but Russian supply still sets the pace. Uzbekistan has the Bukhara and Fergana oil refineries, the Altyaryk unit of the Fergana refinery, and the Uzbekistan GTL complex, but demand has still moved faster than domestic supply. In January-April 2026, gasoline imports reached 568,700 tons, worth $327.1 million, more than double the same period in 2025. Local refineries produced 417,500 tons over those four months. A shift away from AI-80 gasoline has also pushed drivers toward AI-92 and AI-95. The pressure reached the exchange in late June. AI-92 gasoline climbed to a record 13.919 million soums per ton on June 29, about $1,160, after an 11.8% rise since the start of the month. Jet fuel has become an issue, too. Uzbekistan Airways reduced some Russia flight frequencies in June, citing aviation fuel shortages and higher costs. Tashkent is now preparing for winter in concrete volumes. On July 6, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reviewed measures for the 2026-2027 autumn-winter season. The plan includes replacing 53.7 kilometers of defective main gas pipelines, repairing 77 compressor-station gas pumping units, supplying 325,700 tons of liquefied gas, and creating a 120,000-ton motor gasoline reserve for December and January. Thermal power plants are projected to receive 4.161 million tons of coal. Uzbekneftegaz is also due to repair 90 processing units. Tashkent has discussed oil, gasoline, jet fuel, and refinery feedstock supplies with Russian energy companies. Kazakhstan enters the crunch with more domestic refining capacity, but cheap fuel creates its own problems. Kazakhstan’s low pump prices encourage cross-border outflow, especially when neighboring markets pay more. On July 4, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov was told that 593 attempted exports of petroleum products, totaling more than 40,000 liters, had been prevented at road checkpoints since the start of the year. Mobile teams stopped another 61 attempts over two days, involving more than three tons in extra tanks and canisters. Gas planning has joined the security picture. On July 7, Bektenov said Kazakhstan’s domestic gas consumption had reached 20 billion cubic meters last year. The government says 13.1 million people have access to gas and wants gasification to rise from 64.2% to 80%. Bektenov ordered weekly monitoring of gas processing plants at Kashagan, Karachaganak, and Zhanaozen. “We must ensure a long-term balance between the industry’s resource capacity and the needs of the economy,” he said. Electricity adds another layer of stress. Kyrgyzstan recorded its highest summer daily power use on June 29, when consumption reached 47.112 million kilowatt-hours, compared with about 40 million on the same date in 2025. The system expects consumption of 19.6 billion kilowatt-hours in 2026, with domestic generation at 15.7 billion. Imports of about 4 billion kilowatt-hours are expected from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia, mainly in the autumn and winter. Kazakhstan generated 123.1 billion kilowatt-hours in 2025, and consumed 124.6 billion. Tajikistan has fewer buffers. Diesel shortages appeared in Dushanbe in early July, with prices rising by 1.5 to 2 somoni in two days. Some filling stations ran out, while others limited sales to 20 liters per vehicle. On July 6, Tajikistan’s economic authorities held a government-level meeting on fuel supply and price regulation. The agenda covered petroleum products, liquefied gas, import diversification, crude oil processing at domestic facilities, and monitoring to prevent artificial retail price increases. Across Central Asia, the squeeze is taking different forms: Kyrgyzstan is looking for new suppliers, Uzbekistan is building reserves, Kazakhstan is tightening controls, and Tajikistan is watching prices. Low and controlled prices protect families, but they push fuel toward borders. Import dependence keeps pumps open, but it leaves governments exposed to refinery outages abroad. Gasification can ease pressure on coal and power, but it also raises winter demand for gas. Electricity imports can fill a gap, but cold weather turns small deficits into public risk. Central Asia’s fuel squeeze has become a winter energy security problem long before the first cold snap. The region needs gasoline at filling stations, diesel for trucks and farms, gas for homes, coal for power plants, and electricity imports when demand peaks. For households, the labels mean less than the outcome. Heat, light, and transport must hold through December and January.

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers a new election date being set in Kazakhstan, with the country's largest party staying off the ballot, rare protests in Turkmenistan over blackouts and economic frustration, the removal of one of Ashgabat's most important religious figures, renewed clashes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, fuel shortages hitting much of Central Asia, and border swap deals that have seen thousands of people suddenly finding themselves in a new country. Before then turning to our main story this week, where the dramatic end to the Kamchybek Tashiev trials has delivered one of the biggest moments in Kyrgyz politics this year.

Kyrgyzstan’s Water Compensation Push Tests Central Asian Unity

Central Asia’s water diplomacy is entering a contentious phase. Kyrgyzstan, where much of the region’s runoff is formed, is reviving calls for economic compensation from downstream users. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have rejected the idea, saying current agreements do not provide for payments for transboundary river water. The dispute comes as the region tries to maintain annual water-allocation deals while adapting agriculture to worsening scarcity and climate pressure. Water has long tied together the region’s upstream and downstream states. The 2021 and 2022 clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border showed how disputes over land, border infrastructure, roads, security posts, and water access can escalate when local tensions are not contained. Yet political will alone does not guarantee agreements between countries. The Central Asian republics cooperate on water issues through two interstate bodies. One is the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, established in 1993 by all five Central Asian republics. Kyrgyzstan suspended its participation in IFAS in 2016, and now attends the fund’s meetings as an observer. The second body is the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, whose meetings are held once a quarter. At its 93rd meeting in Bukhara in early April, the commission confirmed limits for water withdrawal from transboundary rivers, following decisions approved at the 92nd meeting in Dushanbe. For the Amu Darya, the 2026 water allocations set the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 at about 55.4 billion cubic meters. Of this, 15.9 billion cubic meters is allocated for the cold period, from October to April. Tajikistan has been allocated 9.8 billion cubic meters per year, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each receive 22 billion. A significant part of the flow, 44 billion cubic meters, must pass through the adjusted section of the Kerki hydrological post, helping secure the lower reaches of the river. For the Syr Darya, the total water withdrawal limit for the non-growing season is 4.219 billion cubic meters. Kazakhstan will receive 460 million cubic meters through the Dustlik Canal, Kyrgyzstan 47 million, and Tajikistan 365 million, while the largest share will go to Uzbekistan, 3.347 billion cubic meters. The inherited framework is also facing pressure from outside the five-state system. Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal, which is being advanced outside the Soviet-era allocation structure, has added uncertainty on the Amu Darya. The Central Asian republics also cooperate in bilateral and trilateral formats. In January, Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan joint working groups met in Turkestan. The sides reaffirmed water cooperation, agreed to continue repairs on the Dostyk canal, and planned automated hydrological posts on the Syr Darya. In May, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed on the operating regime of the Bahri-Tojik Reservoir for the summer of 2026. From June to August, the reservoir is to operate in a coordinated mode to supply irrigation water to farmers in the Maktaaral and Zhetysai districts of southern Kazakhstan. These agreements show that regional mechanisms still work, but experts continue to warn that climate pressure, data gaps, and uneven national interests could overwhelm existing formats. “Forecasting the likelihood of ‘water conflicts’ in the near future is difficult, since much depends not only on the political will of states, but also on the availability of effective tools for managing water resources amid scientific uncertainty and discrepancies in data assessment,” according to Shamshagul Mashtayeva, a Kazakh hydrologist and water-diplomacy specialist. “The time has come for a paradigm shift in the management of these resources and in water diplomacy in order to give the second scenario a greater chance, since the well-being of future generations directly depends on the success of these efforts.” In her view, the combined impact of irregular weather patterns, glacier melt, and biodiversity loss creates uncertainty. That uncertainty could lead to two scenarios: growing economic, social, environmental, and political shocks and conflicts over water, or improved policy with large-scale reforms in the water sector. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have responded partly by introducing digital and water-saving technologies, and by changing crop structures. In Kazakhstan, priority in this year’s sowing campaign was given to higher-margin and strategically important crops. Oilseed crops will exceed 4 million hectares, while more than 3.3 million hectares have been allocated for fodder crops. Wheat acreage has been reduced to 12.1 million hectares, 125,000 hectares less than last year. Corn acreage was also reduced. Rice fields were reduced by 20,600 hectares, and the area of cotton under drip irrigation increased by 29,800 hectares as water-saving technologies were expanded. Kazakhstan has taken a stricter approach to reducing rice planting. In the Shardara district of the Turkestan Region, dozens of farmers who planted rice fields beyond approved volumes were left without irrigation water. Permits were processed through an electronic system, and once the limit was reached, registration of new areas was closed. Uzbekistan has also started to shift land away from water-intensive crops. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev supported a proposal in late April to reduce cotton and grain areas by 7,400 hectares in the Ferghana Region and redistribute land to more profitable crops. Orchards and export-oriented plantations are being created in the Ferghana, Yozyovon, Kuva, and Uzbekistan districts. Uzbekistan’s cotton sector has prepared for intensive planting schemes on 888,000 hectares. Of these, 500,000 hectares are planned for high-yielding, salt-resistant, and drought-resistant foreign varieties. Work is also being organized to plant cotton on 300,000 hectares based on Xinjiang’s experience. Kyrgyzstan, where about half of the region’s runoff is formed and which uses roughly a quarter of that water itself, has repeatedly raised the issue of economic compensation for irrigation water. On January 1, 2026, a new Water Code came into force in the republic, changing the approach to the use of water resources. Water is now recognized as a commodity, and fees will be charged for its use by domestic and external consumers. This marks a shift away from the old “water in exchange for electricity” system toward a market model of water use. The new code regulates domestic water use and its distribution among neighbors such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In February, Jogorku Kenesh (parliamentary) deputy Umbetaly Kydyraliyev also raised the issue, saying Kyrgyzstan bears the cost of maintaining hydraulic facilities, including repairs and maintenance of dams, but receives no direct economic compensation. He cited international practice in which countries pay compensation for the use of water resources. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov raised the issue again at a regional economic summit in Astana in April. He said emergencies in Kyrgyzstan have increased significantly in recent years: mudflows and floods have become three times more frequent, while annual damage reaches about $16 million. The glacier area has also shrunk by 16%, and by the end of the century, the country could lose up to 80% of its glaciers. “We propose resuming the introduction of a mutually beneficial economic compensation mechanism in the water and energy sector under modern conditions. It is necessary to find a balance of interests and develop mutually acceptable solutions based on a comprehensive approach,” Japarov said. Professor Yarash Pulodov, a Tajik scholar in water resources and ecology, has supported the introduction of water-use fees in Kyrgyzstan. He said the transition to market mechanisms, under which water would be treated as a commodity, is a logical step. In his view, charging for water is aimed at modernizing water-resource management, increasing transparency, and ensuring efficient distribution in water-scarce regions. “Although water is a gift from heaven and its use can be regarded as the legitimate right of everyone, in a developed society the infrastructure for delivering this water requires significant costs. Ultimately, all water users and consumers must pay for delivery,” he said. Downstream governments do not accept that premise. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan say no agreement has ever existed, and none exists now, to pay for river water. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation said: “The introduction of payment for transboundary water is not provided for by the current contractual and legal framework and is not under consideration. The main emphasis is on improving the efficiency of water use within the country, building and modernizing reservoirs, reducing losses, and introducing water-saving technologies. The system remains based on recognized principles of water sharing, equality of parties, and long-term regional cooperation.” That leaves Central Asian water diplomacy with less room for ambiguity. Annual allocation agreements still function, and governments are investing in more efficient usage. Yet Kyrgyzstan’s warning has put a price tag on a resource downstream states have long treated as shared under existing agreements. Tajikistan, another upstream state, may face similar incentives as glacier loss and infrastructure costs rise. Whether the region can manage that debate without turning water into a new interstate dispute will depend on stronger data, clearer rules, and trust between upstream and downstream states.

New Study Finds Sharp Decline in Amu Darya Flows

Central Asia’s water woes continue to grow worse. The water flow in the Amu Darya, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers, is slowly but significantly diminishing in Tajikistan, where the river originates. A recently released report shows the Amu Darya’s water flow in the middle and lower reaches in Tajikistan has fallen over the course of recent decades by 54-77%. And the report lays the blame firmly on human activity, not climate change. Up In the Mountains of Tajikistan The study published on ScienceDirect looked at data collected over 90 years and concludes that “streamflow decreased by 54–77% in the middle and lower reaches” of the Amu Darya in Tajikistan. Interestingly, the report mentions that precipitation in the mountains of Tajikistan has actually increased between 6 and 13%, but the Amu Darya’s water level is falling because people are using more water. The expansion of agriculture is the reason, accounting for 92% of the water reduction in Tajikistan, but the recent construction of water reservoirs is also playing a role. Lower flows of water were noted on many of the tributaries in Tajikistan that feed into the Amu Darya, including the “Vakhsh, Kunduz, Kofirnihon, Surkhandarya, Zeravshan, and Kashkadarya (rivers),” which showed streamflow reductions of 4–34%. The report said that areas in the upper reaches of the Amu Darya should see increased water levels, but this is mainly due to climate change hastening the melting of snow and glaciers. Once the glaciers are gone, the water will rapidly decrease. Bad News Downstream Water problems upstream in Tajikistan translate to bigger problems downstream in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Both have already noticed a reduction in the amount of water in the Amu Darya, most visibly that the river has not reached the Aral Sea for about two decades now, contributing to the sea shrinking by some 90% since the 1960s. Every year the river recedes further south, forcing downstream communities suddenly without water to relocate. Climate change is now hastening this process in the arid, desert lands along the Uzbek-Turkmen border, but both countries are preparing for a bigger, impending shock. The Taliban started construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal in 2022, with the project scheduled to be completed in 2028. While Central Asia was liberally taking water from the Amu Darya for agricultural use, Afghanistan was in no position to claim its share until now. The canal will draw water from the Amu Darya at an area across from Uzbekistan and open up new agricultural land in northern Afghanistan, where food has long been in short supply. The 280-kilometer canal is expected to take some 16-20% of the water left in the Amu Darya after it leaves Tajikistan. Upstream Tajikistan’s falling water levels, of course, mean the Qosh Tepa Canal will also be receiving less and less water. The Combination For most of the 2020s, large areas of Central Asia have been experiencing droughts, prompting the governments there to implement water conservation measures. But as they find more ways to save water, there is less water to save. In December 2025, Uzbekistan’s hydrometeorological service said autumn temperatures were 1-2 Celsius hotter than average, and precipitation across the country was between 2 and 35% below the seasonal norm. May brought some relief, with 50% more rain than usual falling in the Tashkent Province, as well as substantial amounts in the Samarkand and Jizzakh provinces. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Nurzhan Nurzhigitov, was warning as early as January that his country could face water shortages in the summer. As summer 2026 begins, large areas of Central Asia are already experiencing abnormally high temperatures and below-average rainfall. Kazhydromet warned at the end of June that districts in nine of the country’s 17 provinces could enter drought in July. Uzhydromet has also forecast hot and dry conditions for July. The growing population in Central Asia has been a concern as water scarcity increases. On June 30, Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee announced the country’s population now exceeds 39 million people, up from about 20 million when Uzbekistan became independent in late 1991. Tajikistan’s population is reportedly approaching eleven million, more than double the population of just over five million in 1989. The Central Asian governments have been taking measures to alleviate the effects of climate change for the past few years, especially in terms of water management. Irrigation canals have been repaired, new water reservoirs built, and old reservoirs fixed and improved. But they have always been racing against the clock, and some might say they stand little chance of being able to prevent significant migration pressure of people from southern and western areas of Central Asia in the not-too-distant future as water sources vanish. This recent report indicates that the reduction of water in the Amu Darya is already a long-term problem with no quick solutions in sight. Even hundreds of years ago, water was regarded as the region’s most important resource, and now that message is becoming increasingly tangible across Central Asia.

Chinese Workers Return to Tajik Highway Under Guard After Afghan Border Attacks

Chinese engineers and workers have returned to a highway site in eastern Tajikistan under armed protection. Their return restarts work on a road toward China that stopped after two attacks from Afghanistan killed five Chinese nationals in November. Tajikistan's Transport Ministry said Chinese specialists came back in April to the Kalai-Khumb to Vanj section of the Dushanbe-Kulma highway in Gorno-Badakhshan. They are advising local crews, pouring concrete, fitting tunnel lighting and completing other works. Ozodi said its correspondent saw Tajik special forces guarding Chinese workers in Darvaz in late May, but security officers did not allow photos or video. The return keeps the China-funded Dushanbe-Kulma corridor moving. The road links Dushanbe with the Kulma Pass on the Chinese frontier through the Pamir. The Kalai-Khumb-Vanj works sit close to the Pyanj River, where attacks from the Afghan side are impacting the cost of Chinese projects. Construction on the Kalai-Khumb-Vanj section began on Sept. 20, 2022, with the contract running until September 20, 2026. The contractor is China Road and Bridge Corporation. China is funding the work with a $230 million grant. Once complete, the road section should shrink from 109 kilometers to 92.3 kilometers. It includes two tunnels, five anti-avalanche corridors and 14 bridges. The route crosses Darvaz, one of Tajikistan's hardest mountain road sections. The Transport Ministry has described it as a route that had gone for years without major repairs. The work is meant to allow year-round movement and lower fuel and travel costs. By January, crews had finished 12 of the 14 bridges. Two bridges, avalanche corridors and tunnel systems remained under construction. Work stopped after the November 30 attack in Shodak, a village in Darvaz district. Tajikistan's Border Troops said an armed group came from Ruzvayak in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province and attacked CRBC employees. Two Chinese citizens were killed and two were wounded. Dushanbe called the attackers members of an armed terrorist group, but did not publicly name the organization. Four days earlier, another attack hit Shamsiddin Shohin district in Khatlon, also from Afghan territory. The Chinese embassy said three Chinese citizens were killed and one Chinese citizen was wounded. TCA previously reported that Tajikistan described the strike as using an unmanned aerial vehicle carrying explosives. China reacted with a rare public warning. On December 1, the Chinese embassy urged Chinese companies and personnel to evacuate the Tajik-Afghan border area. Its latest June 9 public warning still told Chinese citizens not to work or travel in Tajikistan's southern border areas, citing a complex security situation and extreme weather. Afghanistan's Taliban government promised cooperation after the killings. Reuters quoted Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi as saying, "The Islamic Emirate is fully prepared to strengthen border security, conduct joint investigations, and engage in any form of coordination… joint measures against malicious elements are a pressing necessity." Taliban officials later said suspects had been detained in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province. The Tajik authorities say the border is stable and under control, while continuing to announce smuggling cases and armed incidents. The border violence did not start with the road project. TCA has tracked a series of incidents around Shamsiddin Shohin, a sparsely populated Khatlon district across the Pyanj River from Afghan Badakhshan. The area has long carried illegal narcotics, weapons, stones and other contraband. Recent tensions add gold mining, Chinese business interests and armed groups to that mix. In November 2024, armed men attacked the Shohin-SM gold mining camp, killing one Chinese worker and wounding others. In August 2025, Tajik border guards exchanged fire with Taliban fighters near Dovang, where gold mining on the Afghan bank had raised disputes over the Panj River's flow. A later December clash in Shamsiddin Shohin killed two Tajik border guards and three attackers. The attacks also put pressure on the Russia-led CSTO, which frames Afghanistan's northern border region as a central security threat. Viktor Vasilyev, chairman of the CSTO Permanent Council, said in June that Afghanistan remained the alliance's main concern in Central Asia. "We plan to increase our joint efforts here, including to neutralize the militants and extremist groups that continue to accumulate on Afghanistan's northern borders," he said, according to TASS. The CSTO has promised more support for Tajikistan's frontier. TCA reported in September 2025 that the alliance plans to begin sending weapons and military equipment for the Tajik-Afghan border in 2026. The program runs through 2029 and covers logistics, communications, and border infrastructure. Public evidence of Russian patrols remains absent. On December 2, Reuters withdrew a story about Tajik-Russian talks on possible patrols after a post-publication review found insufficient evidence. Tajikistan's Foreign Ministry called the claim untrue. For now, Russia's confirmed role lies in CSTO plans, exercises and equipment, not a publicly confirmed deployment. In March, Tajik lawmakers approved a Chinese-funded plan to build nine border facilities near Afghanistan. The project is valued at more than 550 million somoni, or about $57.4 million. It includes access roads, water, drainage, electricity and equipment. Chinese funding also helped build twelve Tajik border installations in 2017 and 2018. The road's restart shows how closely Tajikistan's economic projects now sit beside its security problems. Dushanbe needs the road for links to Gorno-Badakhshan and China, while Beijing wants its citizens protected before its companies return to work. Kabul, meanwhile, wants to show it can police militants and criminals on Afghan soil, while Moscow and the CSTO want to remain central to Tajik border security. Those pressures meet in Darvaz. The crews are back, but the road now depends on more than concrete and mountain engineering. It depends on armed Tajik protection and Taliban promises.

Central Asian Labor Migration Shifts as Russia Loses Some of Its Pull

Russia remains the main destination for many Central Asian labor migrants, but its dominance is weakening. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, tougher Russian migration rules, and rising hostility toward migrants have pushed workers from the region to look elsewhere. South Korea, the Gulf states, the United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and other destinations are increasingly competing with Russia for Central Asian labor. The result is not a collapse of the old migration model, but a visible diversification of flows as the geography of labor migration from the region expands. Kazakhstan: From Destination Country to Source of Skilled Migrants Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, most labor migrants from Central Asia have traveled to Russia in search of work. A shortage of local labor, relatively decent wages, familiarity with the language, and a similar mentality have driven many to seek jobs in major Russian cities. Kazakhstan is an exception. It has not seen mass migration of its own citizens into lower-skilled jobs in Russia such as janitorial or construction work. Kazakhstan’s own economy offers such jobs, unemployment has remained low, and employers continue to report shortages in both manual work and skilled professions. The Bureau of National Statistics put unemployment at 4.5% in the first quarter of 2026. For this reason, Kazakhstan has also long been a destination for migrants from neighboring states, even if Russia has traditionally attracted larger flows. Kazakh citizens working abroad generally aim for higher-paying jobs in sectors requiring qualifications. The government was already tracking this in 2024, when the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection reported, using Foreign Ministry data, that 137,000 Kazakh citizens were abroad for employment purposes. The largest numbers were in Russia, South Korea, Turkey, and the UAE, with smaller numbers in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. A later Ministry report showed the same pattern, with Russia still dominant but alternatives clearly visible: of 126,000 Kazakh citizens employed abroad, 102,000 were in Russia, 15,000 in South Korea, and around 2,000 in the United Kingdom and European Union member states. Those leaving include economists, lawyers, technical specialists, teachers, and medical workers. Although outward labor migration remains limited compared with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan, it is adding to official concerns about the loss of qualified specialists. Officials believe Kazakhstan’s labor market is vulnerable to external competition, and a large share of those leaving have higher or technical vocational education. Salary gaps and differences in living standards make these destinations attractive. Qatar has recently joined the list of preferred destinations for labor migration. This has been made possible in large part by intergovernmental agreements signed between Qatar and Kazakhstan. Qatar is now actively recruiting Kazakh specialists, particularly in the oil and gas sector. According to Arman Shokparov, co-founder of People Consulting, around 600-700 Kazakh white-collar professionals currently work in Qatar. Nearly half work in the oil and gas sector, mainly in engineering and production roles. This trend does not mean Kazakhstan is only losing workers. It continues to attract immigrants and returnees, including ethnic Kazakhs under long-running resettlement programs, and the government is also trying to manage internal migration toward labor-short regions. Its new migration policy through 2030 prioritizes skilled migration and relocation to regions with shortages, underscoring that Kazakhstan is both a source and a destination in the region’s labor market. Uzbekistan: Organized Recruitment Beyond Russia According to Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee, as of January 1, 2026, the country’s permanent population stood at 38.2 million. Experts believe Uzbekistan can now claim to be the second-most populous post-Soviet state after Russia. Ukraine once held that position, but its population has declined significantly, and no census has been conducted there since 2000. Uzbekistan’s migration balance remained negative: 1,159 people moved to the country for permanent residence, while 10,117 left. Most immigrants to Uzbekistan come from former Soviet states. Russia remains the main source, accounting for 34.1% of all arrivals in the first quarter of 2026. Another 19.7% came from Kazakhstan, and 12.2% from Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan accounted for 4.9%, and Turkmenistan 3.7%. The remaining 25.4% came from other countries. The number of Uzbek citizens working abroad reached 1.2 million, according to an official Migration Agency statement by director Behzod Musaev in May 2026. Unofficial estimates of the broader Uzbek population abroad are higher, but the categories differ and are not directly comparable. Traditionally, Russia and Kazakhstan were the main destinations for Uzbek labor migrants, and Russia remains central. TCA reported that around 106,000 Uzbek citizens went to work in Russia in 2025 through organized recruitment programs. However, migration trends are gradually shifting: organized recruitment to South Korea, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, Canada, and other European or Asian destinations is becoming more visible. The reason for this shift is not only tougher migration legislation in Russia, but also the search for higher wages, safer legal channels, and more predictable working conditions. Kyrgyzstan: Russia Still Dominates, but Alternatives Are Expanding Between January and March 2026, around 3,400 people arrived in Kyrgyzstan for permanent residence, while 353 left. These figures come from the National Statistics Committee. Some analysts link this positive migration balance to relocants from Russia. In 2022, 1.09 million Kyrgyz citizens were temporarily absent from their permanent place of residence. Of these, 964,600 people, or 88.1%, were away for work, meaning labor migrants accounted for 28% of the working-age population. As recently as 2025, government official Bakyt Darmankul uulu confirmed the trend: the number of Kyrgyz migrants in Russia has significantly declined in recent years. According to him, around 600,000 Kyrgyz citizens were working abroad at that time, including 379,000 in Russia. In 2020, the number in Russia stood at around 680,000. He said some returnees from Russia are now heading to other countries. Today, labor migration from Kyrgyzstan extends to 29 countries, with the United Kingdom currently the most in-demand destination. Most people going to Europe and Asia work in seasonal jobs. The UK has provided 40,000 quotas for foreign workers, 10,000 of them for Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz citizens also travel for work to Egypt, the UAE, Kazakhstan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Belarus, Estonia, Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary, South Korea, Turkey, and other countries. The growth of alternative routes is creating a need for better oversight. TCA reported in 2026 that 159 private agencies in Kyrgyzstan held licenses to facilitate employment abroad, while interest in jobs in Europe and Southeast Asia had increased. These channels can make migration safer and more organized, but migrants still face risks when working conditions abroad do not match recruiters’ promises. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan: Flows Are Changing As always, official statistics for Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are mostly available only through foreign sources. Nevertheless, citizens of both countries are increasingly less likely to see Russia as their only realistic destination for work. In Poland, for example, labor migration from Central Asia is growing. In the first quarter of 2026, Tajik citizens received around 6,000 work permits, according to Marta Jaroszewicz of the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw. She estimated that up to 30,000 Central Asian migrants now live in Poland, with most from Uzbekistan, followed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. According to Jaroszewicz, in the first quarter of 2026 Poland issued around 16,000 work permits to Uzbek citizens, 12,000 to Kazakhs, nearly 8,000 to Kyrgyz citizens, and 6,000 to Tajiks. She stressed that labor migration to Poland remains predominantly male. She also believes migration from Central Asia to Europe could grow substantially in the coming years, driven by demographics, population growth, and a large number of young people and students. Belarusian sources point to a similar shift in Turkmen flows, though figures vary by period and category. One report citing Belarus’ Department of Citizenship and Migration said Turkmenistan had become the largest source of foreign labor migrants, with 23,050 Turkmen citizens, or 48% of the total. Another shorter-period figure reported 6,915 arrivals. The key point is the same: Belarus has become a more visible destination for Turkmen workers, especially in services, construction, and equipment maintenance. Russian authorities also confirmed a significant decline in labor migration from Tajikistan in 2024. More recent reporting points to the same broader direction, with Tajikistan actively seeking new destinations for labor migrants. Tajik migration links with Russia remain deep, but some Russia-centered pathways are weakening as legal, political, and social conditions become more difficult. Russia remains the largest destination for many Central Asian workers, but it is no longer the only choice. The emerging pattern is not a sudden break with the post-Soviet migration system, but gradual diversification, with other destinations now part of a broader labor-migration map. For Central Asian governments, this creates opportunities, including higher wages, remittances, and legal recruitment channels, as well as risks such as brain drain, worker vulnerability abroad, and stronger competition for skilled labor at home.