Danish daughters

Using Danish administrative data, we compare parents of only children who experience a stroke at the same age and differ only in the gender of their child.

Before the stroke, parents of daughters and parents of sons follow similar health trajectories, with comparable levels of pre-existing conditions and healthcare utilization. After the stroke, a survival gap opens and grows, and parents of daughters are 1.5 percentage points more likely to be alive by year five. Over the same period, daughters adjust more than sons along several margins: they become more likely to live near their parents, less likely to be married, and have fewer children, consistent with greater involvement in informal caregiving.

Crucially, parents of daughters use more physical rehabilitation, an elective type of formal care that requires sustained engagement. Rather than crowding out formal provision, daughters appear more likely to help parents navigate and use professional services. Informal and formal care can therefore operate, at least in part, as complements in the response to severe health shocks.

That recent work is from recent work by Elin Colmsjö, Francesco Ruggieri, and Matteo Saccarola.  Via the excellent Samir Varma.

Will AI Growth Reach the Developing World?

Here is the abstract from a new NBER paper by Daniel Björkegren, David Lagakos & Mitchell VanVuren:

This paper explores how economic growth driven by AI will impact the developing world. Our analysis is based on a growth model of a developed and developing economy where AI services are traded on the world market, and may substitute for or complement different labor inputs in production. Preferences allow for the possibility that demand for services provided by AI has an upper bound. The model predicts that developing countries may not benefit as much from AI-driven growth. First, they may lack complementary skills needed to fully utilize AI domestically. Second, they may be priced out of world markets due to their relatively lower productivity. We use our model to simulate how growth and welfare are affected by making workers more complementary to AI, subsidizing compute, speeding technology diffusion, and providing cash transfers. Numerical simulations of the model suggest that the potential for developing countries to be left behind – or having some workers lose in absolute terms – is substantial enough that researchers should study the impacts of AI on developing countries in real time.

I am more optimistic than the authors.  For one thing, in their model AI improves the productivity of legal services in say Africa, but not food.  That mix seems unlikely to me.  AI already makes rainfall prediction and crop management more productive, and it might over time help create more “miracle crops.”  A few other points:

1. I do not expect wealthy and poor countries to converge, and the gap might even increase with AI.  But the poorer countries can sell more of their resources to the wealthy countries, and are likely much better off anyway, compared to no AI.  If you read the authors carefully, they do not (seem to?) deny that, yet it is framed as being “left behind.”

2. You might think that AI and robots discourage the export-oriented industrialization for today’s poor countries.  In my view, that was not going to happen anyway, admittedly that is a subjective judgment.

3. The poorer economies typically have an excess of politics and corruption, even if government spending as a share of gdp is relatively low.  This suggests “AI lawyers” will not put “African lawyers” out of business soon, even if the AI lawyers are very good.  Practicing law is bundled with politics to a very high degree.  That fact is unfortunate, but it implies a high degree of job protection and a centaur model, rather than full work displacement.

4. Will the poor countries satiate in AI-provided services, such as legal services, as is the case in some versions of this model?  That seems unlikely, as more growth can boost the demand for legal services more or less indefinitely.  And so so many people in those countries right now cannot afford decent lawyers.  That prospect of satiation seems very far off indeed.

5. Rather than having a single world market for AI, why not have tiered markets, where the poor countries buy lower-quality AI services but at lower prices and also they avoid being shut out of the prime market?

6. The autors (p.11) hold TFP fixed for many parts of the economy.  Of course that will lower the gains from AI.

7. p.44 argues that developing economies are becoming priced out of AI inputs already.  I would be shocked if that prediction turns out to be true, rather I expect smartphone usage (as opposed to mere cell phones) to continue to increase at a rapid pace.

So overall there is way too much negative framing in this piece, and the negative framings seem deliberately chosen, rather than falling out of a more basic or primitive model.

Saturday assorted links

1. Many federal agencies are hiring economists.

2. Theodore Zeldin, RIP.

3. Henry Oliver on Paradise Lost.

4. Quantum computing even weirder than you think? (NYT)  And an article bullish on quantum computing (NYT).

5. Good AI policy ideas from Joshua Saxe.

6. Podcast with SBF from prison, have not had a chance to listen, looks interesting.

7.. Possible implications of the generalized Riemann proof?

A simple observation

The Riemann proof seems like a true surprise.  Yet on the same day Anthropic shares fell about ten percent.  In other words, the market feels that “capabilities” do not necessarily translate into significant social and economic outcomes.

Yet cybersecurity stocks are up considerably over the last few months, due to heightened cyber risk.  So the market is hardly unaware of AI and its potential, when the connection is real and evident.

Just a simple point to ponder.  Here are good comments from Alex Imas and Seb Krier.

*The Great Enrichment*

The author is my colleague Vincent Geloso and the subtitle is A New History of American Growth and Inequality, 1865-1945.  Here is an excerpt from the very beginning:

…regardless of what improvements you think occurred during the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, you are underestimating how much improvement there truly was.  From 1870 to the start off World War I, America experienced the fastest and most stunning rise in the quality of life of the downtrodden, the poor, the unskilled, the midskilled, and the average Joe (i.e., the poorest 90% of Americans) ever seen in human history up to that point.  Second, it was the period from World War I to the end of World War II that was marked by slower — though still substantial — gains for people at the bottom of the income ladder.  Third, the improvements in the living standards of the poorest 90 percent of the population were faster than those of the top 10 percent and as fast as those of the top 1 percent from 1870 to 191.  During those four decades, America was a lean and mean egalitarian growth machine.  Fourth, this machine was fueled by America’s exceptionally dynamic market economy, which allowed people to move to pursue better opportunities (either in terms of industries or in terms of geography).  While some state actions did contribute to this machine, market forces own the lion’s share, and, in many cases, they actually made government actions more effective.  Fifth, America developed a welfare state only because, in the aftermath of World War I, the growth machine slowed down.

An excellent and much-needed book, definitely recommended.

Emergent Ventures, 60th cohort

Faris Allafi, Abu Dhabi, 13, train AI models.

Eliel Selin, Helsinki, 18, AI agents.

Robert Boswall, London area, energy information for the UK.

Alex Yang, Harvard, genetics for better organ transplants.

Stanislaw Tomaszewski, Warsaw area, AI agents and the organization of trucking.

Jonas Dolezal, London, nuclear fusion.

Shawnak Shivakumar, Stanford, longevity research.

Ruzgar Albayrak, Izmir, 15, on-device AI.

Kaya Bora Hoşgör, Eleutheros Tech, Istanbul, 17, AI companion.

Jude Wallis, Hermosa Beach, 17, build an economics learning site with agents.

Ben Cope, London, superior connectivity for the UK.

Yigit Kiran, Samsun, Turkey, 16, AI agents.

Angadh Nanjangudh, London, science, AI, and space.

Friday assorted links

1. Markets drive moods, and not vice versa?

2. AI literary scandals and the future of the Latin American novel.

3. New Stripe Press website.

4. Does Claude’s constitution mean anything?

5. Did the Baby Boom help cause the later divorce boom?

6. “Social adversity in early life has minimal, predominantly positive long-term consequences for social behaviour in mountain gorillas.”

7. University of Austin hiring in economics.

8. Good book on the Riemann hypothesis, whether or not it turns out to have been proved.  An interesting related question is whether this rumor (or is it more than that?) will at all budge the Anthropic share price, as Claude was running the proof.  Also claims of Unforced Navier-Stokes.

Phonics-based Instruction and Student Achievement

That is a new NBER working paper by Alex Hollingsworth, Alberto Ortega & Nikolaos Zirogiannis.  Abstract:

Reading is a foundational skill, yet fewer than one in three US fourth graders read at a proficient level. How best to teach reading and improve educational attainment has been an active policy debate for decades. Recently, phonics-based approaches have surged in popularity, even though the largest attempt to put similar methods into classrooms was previously abandoned out of concerns that the program was ineffective. This paper studies Reading First, a nearly $1 billion per year federal program established under No Child Left Behind that promoted phonics-based instruction in K-3 classrooms. Exploiting administrative data from Texas and program eligibility formulas, we estimate effects via difference-in-differences and instrumental variables specifications. We find that eligibility increased third-grade reading test scores by 0.1 standard deviations and that effects persisted through at least the eighth grade. An analysis of digitized exam questions shows that treated students outperformed peers on questions that required basic decoding skills and those with more words, a benefit that also drove improvements in math scores. We follow exposed cohorts into early adulthood, finding that the program increased on-time high school graduation, college enrollment, four-year college completion, and adult earnings at age 25.

As with many “ban cell phones in schools” papers, I find these results underwhelming.  Nonetheless phonics education always has made sense to me.

AIs vs. humans in economics papers

Is agentic research any good? Dr Yanagizawa-Drott and his colleague, Olaf Willner, used an AI verifier to check 1,000 APE papers. None was error-free; 842 contained at least one severe error, including ones invalidating headline results. To see roughly how Ape stacks up against human primates, The Economist teamed up with Refine, the research-verification firm founded by Dr Golub. Refine chose 100 papers at random from those accepted for publication in the top five journals (including QJE and JPE ) in the first nine months of 2026. It then subjected them to thorough review using several frontier AI models plus a once-over for serious errors by a human reviewer. The exercise flagged 4,158 issues in the 100 papers. One in ten papers contained at least one grave error (other problems concerned interpretation or inconsistencies between tables and text).

The two exercises are not directly comparable, but human economists’ lower error rate might give them some hope. In ideas, too, people retain the edge. One experiment, by Alexis Akira Toda of Emory University, found that when considering papers on economic theory alone, AI lowers the cost of checking for a candidate flaw but “does not yet reliably substitute for the human judgment that locates the flaw in the first place”. Another, which compared APE papers with published papers found the difference is mostly in ideas, not execution. In a further study, Michele Zampa of the Geneva Graduate Institute used an AI referee to grade 981 AI papers and 41 human ones on things like the novelty of research questions and acknowledgment of methodological limitations. AI did better in crowded fields with lots of existing research to digest. Humans performed at the same level regardless of the size of the literature.

…Benjamin Kohler of ETH Zürich, another Swiss university, and colleagues, let AI reproduce 48 social-science papers, using only the studies’ raw data and a description of the method. The discrepancies between the original papers and the AI versions were due in roughly equal measure to problems with the AI and human work. But the better the AI model, the more the balance tilted against humans.

Here is more from The Economist, interesting throughout.

Thursday assorted links

1. How to turn AI-written maths into a video.

2. Honeypot markets in everything?

3. Traveling a lot without going on planes (WSJ).

4. American audiovisual exports have plunged in terms of global share (I think that is fine and arguably good, by the way).

5. “There’s been a 30 year debate between cyber revolutionaries and cyber skeptics about how much cyber alone can actually achieve in terms of espionage, sabotage, and destabilisation. The war in Ukraine has swung the empirical pendulum hard toward the skeptics: cyber has played a fairly minimal strategic role, struggling to translate digital disruption into durable physical or political control.” Link, with some more on AI.  On AI scenarios, here are some more critical points.

6. Casey Handmer looks at astrophysics research.

7. Greg Conti on AI (and me).

8. Kevin Roose on early Anthropic.

9. Nicholas Decker.

10. The utter wisdom of Thomas Nagel.  And more.  And Erik Hoel.  The take from Ben Gross is perhaps the best yet.

The Anthropic IPO

In general I am bullish on the commercial prospects of AI companies, including Anthropic (do note I am on the Advisory Board, though with zero governance role and zero access to internal information).

But I view today’s IPO as a sign of bearishness on any kind of extreme superintelligence, no matter what involved parties might say.

If superintelligence is coming soon, why turn yourself into a public company, with all the extra scrutiny and regulation that requires?  Raising extra money through debt is the obvious alternative — why cut other in on such an amazing deal?

Furthermore, true superintelligence is likely to raise real interest rates, which raises the return to borrowing today (you can always reinvest at higher rates later, if you do not need the money for compute, etc.).

Now raising money through debt would be relatively costly for Anthropic, but at the very least they could have shrunk the size of the IPO and borrowed more at the margin.  Claude says they would have had to pay about ten to eleven percent on that debt.  Alternately, they could just take on Jane Street, Citadel, and others and try to earn money through direct commercial activities (but in fact they cannot, note that).

So presumably Anthropic thinks that pending advances, whatever you might wish to call them, will not with any great certainty yield ten to eleven percent at the margin.  That is a perfectly fine view for them to hold, but you all should use the implied inference to calm down a bit about what is coming.

I myself am taking that wise and prudent financial decision under advisement, and it does not imply an incredibly radical near future.  Keep in mind that the average return on American corporate capital is about seven percent.

Addendum: Maybe there is some clever 3-D chess strategy whereby they do the IPO, and then turn around and borrow lots at a much lower rate, say six to seven percent.  And still come out ahead, relative to no IPO, by busting through a credit constraint.  Maybe.  We’ll see if that happens, but it strikes me as a rather strained possibility.

Here is some sanity from Theo.

Will Baird, book maven (from my email)

Tyler and Alex,

I have built Marginalia Library: using AI and the archives you have helpfully posted, I found every time a book has been mentioned on Marginal Revolution and created a searchable, browsable catalog.

The catalog currently covers 13,315 mentions of 7,968 books across 7,306 posts. Mentions come from the entire Marginal Revolution corpus, not just posts in the Books category. The site does not directly quote anything from Marginal Revolution other than post titles, which link to the relevant post where a book was mentioned.

In addition to compiling mentioned books, I had Claude determine whether books were evaluated (positively, negatively, or mixed), recommended, or described as “self-recommending.” This let me identify books you’ve both evaluated: while there are 98 books you have evaluated similarly, there are 10 where you’ve differed.

This project was created almost entirely with Claude Code and the Claude API, though I used GPT-6 Luna to do the first pass over the entire archive. I checked about 2,000 links and 650 labels by hand. I’m sure there are still some mistakes, and each record has a contact address for users to reach out with a correction.

I’ve been a reader of Marginal Revolution for a long time and have discovered some of my favorite books by reading about them on MR. This project was a way for me to improve my discovery of new books and learn more about how to use AI (I’m already reading Robert Hughes’ The Fatal Shore after finding it in this process). This is a labor of love: Marginalia Library does not and will not have ads, tracking, or affiliate links, and I plan to keep it current from the weekly Marginal Revolution AI Archive updates.

UK productivity update

Output per hour worked increased by 2.5% in Quarter 3 (July to Sept) 2026 compared with the same quarter a year ago, reflecting a 2.0% increase in GVA and a 0.5% decrease in hours worked.

Output per worker increased by 2.0% in Quarter 3 2026 compared with the same quarter a year ago. This was its strongest growth since Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2018, excluding the pandemic period.

Here is the official release, via Peter Whittaker.  First, they are going to squeak through.  Second, immigration did not ruin the country and will not lead to civil war.