Midvikudags

Questions
- Is truth equal to our concept of “right” (in terms of morality (is it subjective))?
— Is it merely truth and falsehood, or is the relationship more like truth and non-truth? Is everything that is not “truth” by default “false”? Are either or both of those morally wrong/right?
— Is truth subjective and/or malleable? Are those descriptors one and the same? In reference to that, if truth is malleable (better word is relative), is it subjective?
— Is it only subjective or objective, or more of a spectrum?
General idea: truth cannot merely be “something that cannot be disproven”, as our views of truth change every day. However, does that mean there are two forms of truth: relative and ultimate? What is “ultimate truth”, and is it just a concept based in faith (religion)?

Is “we do not forgive; we do not forget” a moral view?

Kant: It is never acceptable to tell a lie.
Kant believed that morality came from within, and we are constantly pulled by moral reasons that are called categorical imperatives. A categorical imperative is “humanity formulation”, which means that “we should always treat other people as if they are ends in themselves, never merely means.” Other people always have their own goals and objectives, which means it is never okay to treat them as a tool for our own ends.

Kant's reply to Maria von Herbert in regard to her lie:
”… I do not know whether your relationship is one of marriage or friendship, but it makes no significant difference. For love, be it for one's spouse or for a friend, presupposes the same mutual esteem for the other's character, without which it is no more than perishable, sensual delusion.
A love like that wants to communicate itself completely, and it expects of its respondent a similar sharing of heart, unweakened by distrustful reticence. That is what the ideal of friendship demands. But there is something in us which puts limits on such frankness, some obstacle to this mutual outpouring of the heart, which makes one keep some part of one's thoughts locked within oneself, even when one is most intimate. The sages of old complained of this secret distrust—'My dear friends, there is no such thing as a friend!' We can't expect frankness of people, since everyone fears that to reveal himself completely would be to make himself despised by others. But this lack of frankness, this reticence, is still very different from dishonesty. What the honest but reticent man says is true, but not the whole truth. What the dishonest man says is something he knows to be false. Such an assertion is called, in the theory of virtue, a lie. It may be harmless, but it is not on that account innocent. It is a serious violation of a duty to oneself; it subverts the dignity of humanity in our own person, and attacks the roots of our thinking. As you see, you have sought counsel from a physician who is no flatterer.
… Ask yourself whether you reproach yourself for the imprudence of confessing, or for the immorality intrinsic to the lie. If the former, then you regret having done your duty. And why? Because it has resulted in the loss of your friend's confidence. This regret is not motivated by anything moral, since it is produced by an awareness not of the act itself, but of its consequences. But if your reproach is grounded in a moral judgment of your behaviour, it would be a poor moral physician who would advise you to cast it from your mind.
… If [a change in his demeanor as a result of your change of attitude] doesn't happen, then the earlier warmth of his affection was more physical than moral, and would have disappeared anyway⁣—a misfortune which we often encounter in life, and when we do, must meet with composure. For the value of life, insofar as it consists of the enjoyment we get from people, is vastly overrated.
Here then, my dear friend, you find the customary divisions of a sermon: instruction, penalty and comfort. Devote yourself to the first two; when they have had their effect, comfort will be found by itself.

All lies, whether by omission, white lies, outright falsehoods, or any strategic truth to disguise motives and ends are wrong.

Kant believed that actions are good or bad completely apart from their consequences; we must obey the categorical imperative for the right reasons. Lying involves disguising our true ends, making it impossible for one to agree or disagree with our ends. Kant regarded this as a form of objectification, and as a result, you are morally responsible for the consequences that occur after telling a lie; lying takes away the power of destiny from someone. However, if we tell the truth, the moral guilt is on the fault of the supposed “wrongdoer” in the consequences (murderer dilemma).

If you do the right thing for the right reasons, you can't have done anything wrong. Lying to somebody puts yourself and your ends above them, treating yourself as superior.

It is not about the consequences, it is about who is human (and, intrinsically, moral).

-------

I thought about most of this after meditating and taking notes on a PhilosophyTube video on Kant. I have some of his works downloaded to read during Physics tomorrow.